Built for the deal nobody else serves

Owner grants development rights (JDA + limited power of attorney) but keeps title until handover. Developer builds entirely at own cost; the finished built-up area is split by an agreed ratio and each party sells or keeps its own units.

Same grant of development rights, but the owner takes a percentage of gross sales revenue instead of units. Developer controls pricing and sales; escrow and audit rights are standard protections.

Owner conveys land into a new project company at an agreed value; that value becomes the owner's equity stake. Developer and investors contribute cash and expertise; profits distribute through a waterfall (capital back → preferred return → promote).

Owner keeps the freehold and grants a 49–99 year lease. Developer builds and owns the improvements for the term, paying ground rent (often ~4–6% of land value, with resets). Land and buildings revert to the owner at expiry.

A registrable in-rem right (up to 50 years, renewable) letting the developer build and own buildings on the owner's land — mortgageable and sellable. Buildings revert at expiry per contract. The Sharia-compliant workhorse of UAE/GCC land partnerships.

German registered, inheritable, mortgageable right to own a building on another's land for 60–99 years. Owner receives indexed ground rent (Erbbauzins, ~1.5–4% of land value p.a.); at expiry the building is compensated (statutory minimum 2/3 of value for housing).

Owner transfers the plot and is paid in finished units of the future building (typically 25–35% of buildable area), transferred at completion. Spain and Portugal's classic owner-friendly structure; taxed on both legs — structure with advice.

French sibling of the permuta: the landowner is paid partly or wholly in finished premises. Often paired with a VEFA forward-sale of the remainder to institutions.

A promoter funds the planning application at its own risk. On consent, the land is sold on the open market; the promoter recovers costs plus a fee (~15–30% of net proceeds) and the owner keeps the rest. Aligns both parties to maximise price.

Developer pays a small option fee for the exclusive right (3–10 years) to buy the land after securing planning, at market value minus an agreed discount (typically 10–25%).

An institution buys the land day one and funds construction in draws (forward funding), or contracts to buy the completed building at a fixed price (forward sale). The developer earns a development margin; the owner usually exits cleanly at the land sale.

Owner keeps ownership and funds the project; the developer acts as development manager for a base fee (2–5% of cost) plus a promote (10–30% of profit above a hurdle). Effectively a JV without a land transfer.

Owner sells to the developer's SPV but leaves 30–70% of the price in as a loan (second charge behind the senior lender) or as deferred payments tied to sales milestones — the owner becomes the project's mezzanine lender at ~8–15%.

Mostly for public or institutional land: the developer designs, builds, finances and operates for 20–50 years, paying an upfront premium and/or revenue share, then transfers the asset back.

Parties define allowable costs, the developer builds and sells, and net profit (after defined costs, fees, finance and a profit waterfall) is split by agreed percentages, often with a preferred return and minimum guarantee.

Owner takes a percentage of gross sales/rental/operating revenue, escrow-controlled, often tiered by threshold with a minimum guaranteed payment.

Approved GFA is allocated between parties as building/floor/unit entitlements, with value-equalisation and conversion from GFA to NSA/NFA at an agreed efficiency ratio.

Split defined on net saleable/leasable area by use (residential/retail/office/hotel) rather than gross GFA, isolating the owner from efficiency risk.

Owner receives completed, income-ready assets (villas, apartments, offices, hotel rooms, warehouses, parking) of defined type/size/floor/view/value at a handover date, value-equalised against the land contribution.

Land bought at a fixed price, paid upfront, deferred, by milestone, from project sales/finance, in annual instalments or a cash-and-units mix, secured by escrow and (if deferred) a profit/interest rate.

Owner receives an agreed multiple of the initial land value (e.g. 1.25×, 1.5×, 2×) as final entitlement, split cash/units on a payment schedule with a security package; implies a target annualised return.

Any combination of cash, annual rent, upfront premium, GFA/NSA/ready-stock, net-profit or gross-revenue share, equity, preferred return, minimum guarantee and public-service/infrastructure obligations tuned to both parties.

Fixed/escalating/indexed/turnover rent (or base + turnover) with an upfront premium, rent-free development period, renewal, assignment, sublease and financing rights, and development/handover/reinstatement obligations.

Private party finances, builds, temporarily owns and operates the asset, then transfers ownership to the authority at concession end; lenders and grantor hold step-in rights and residual-value/handback terms are defined.

Private party builds, permanently owns and operates under licence/regulation with no transfer; land rights, tariffs, service standards and government oversight are set by contract/regulation.

Private party builds and immediately transfers ownership to the authority on completion, then operates under an operating agreement for a fee against performance standards.

A single contractor takes design and construction under one contract — fixed-price, cost-plus, GMP, two-stage, fast-track or contractor-led — with optional consultant novation and early-contractor involvement.

Contractor designs, builds and finances construction, with the authority repaying via deferred/milestone payments at an agreed financing rate against a completion certificate.

Private party designs, builds, finances and operates for the concession, paid via availability payments, user charges or government payments, subject to performance deductions.

Full-lifecycle PPP: private party designs, builds, finances, operates and maintains — including lifecycle replacement — under a performance regime with service KPIs and handback/residual-life obligations.

Private party designs, builds, operates and maintains, while the authority (or a third party) funds the capital — bundling delivery and operations without private finance.

Long-term contract where the private party delivers and/or operates a public asset/service under a payment mechanism (government-pay, user-pay or hybrid) with a defined risk-allocation matrix.

The authority grants a private party the right to operate (and often build/rehabilitate) an asset and collect user charges for a defined period, paying a concession fee/revenue share and transferring the asset back at expiry.

Occupier/operator leases land, buildings or assets with rent partly crediting toward an eventual purchase at a pre-agreed price, transferring ownership once conditions are met.

Private party leases an existing asset/land, develops or upgrades it, and operates it for the lease term, paying rent and often a revenue share; the asset stays with the authority.

Like LDO but the developed asset transfers to the authority at the end of the lease rather than continuing to be operated by the private party.

Private party rehabilitates an existing (often distressed) asset, operates it to recover investment plus return, then transfers it back to the authority.

Private party rehabilitates and then permanently owns and operates the asset under regulation — no transfer back.

Private operator runs and maintains an asset for a fee (fixed and/or performance-based) against KPIs; no capital or ownership transfer.

Operator manages the asset/business for a base management fee plus an incentive fee tied to performance, with the owner retaining ownership and most operating risk.

Authority pays the private party a periodic availability payment provided the asset is available and meets performance standards, insulating the private side from demand risk; deductions apply for unavailability/underperformance.

Authority guarantees a minimum revenue/traffic/occupancy/purchase level (with upside sharing above a band), de-risking demand for the private party; take-or-pay and capacity payments are cousins.

A creditworthy offtaker (often government) commits to buy the project's output — power, water, treated waste, capacity — at an agreed tariff for a long term (power/water purchase or take-or-pay agreements), underpinning project finance.

Authority leases or concessions a mature, income-producing public asset to private investors for an upfront capital sum, recycling the proceeds into new infrastructure while retaining ownership and reversion.

Owner sells the asset to an investor and immediately leases it back on a long lease, freeing capital while retaining use; rent, term, buyback options and repair obligations are the key terms.

Contractor is reimbursed actual costs plus an agreed fee/margin; suits uncertain scope but shifts cost risk to the client, often capped or converted to GMP.

Contractor guarantees a ceiling price; costs below the cap are shared (pain/gain), costs above are borne by the contractor — blending cost-plus transparency with price certainty.

Contractor delivers a fully complete, ready-to-operate facility for a fixed price, handing over the 'key' — maximum single-point responsibility including commissioning.

Contractor delivers engineering, procurement and construction under a lump-sum turnkey contract with performance guarantees — the infrastructure/industrial delivery standard.

EPC contractor also arranges/provides construction finance, repaid by the client over time — combining lump-sum delivery with a financing package.

Contractor manages engineering, procurement and construction as the client's agent for a fee, with the client holding the works contracts and cost risk directly.

A private party proposes a project the authority did not tender; the authority evaluates it and, if it proceeds, either negotiates directly (with protections) or takes it to competition — often via Swiss Challenge.

After an unsolicited proposal, the authority publishes it and invites competing bids; the original proponent gets a right to match (or is compensated) if a better bid emerges — combining origination incentive with competitive tension.